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tion awards 126 will be attempted in the federal courts and that the older

common law view barring resubmission of disputes will not be followed.127
CONCLUSION

The number of cases decided under section 301 is still too few to permit
the statement of broad principles of the emerging law. Because the cases
arise in factual contexts where the determinative considerations may differ
for superficially similar cases, 128 the effect of precedent will not be strong
for some time yet. Moreover, internal disagreements remain unsolved. Lower
federal courts have reached divergent results, suggesting conflicting judicial
attitudes toward enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under

section 301.129 The Supreme Court remains itself divided: one camp espouses
the development of a specialized industrial contract law;130 the other places
greater emphasis upon conventional contract doctrines.131 The resolution
of this conflict and its impact upon the development of substantive law under
section 301 stimulates a continuing interest in litigation under this section.
12 6 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961); Howard
v. United States Rubber Co., 190 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1961).
127 Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959),
aff'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, Garment Workers Union,
283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960). Contra, Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers Union,
187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
128 See, e.g., the discussion of the Patterson Parchment and Dahlem cases in the text
at note 84 supra.
129 See the discussion in text of the diversity of opinion in the lower federal courts concerning such questions as the application of the Westinghouse doctrine, the availability
of declaratory relief under 301, and the arbitrability of breaches of no-strike clauses.
NSO
See, e.g., Justice Douglas' remarks in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459,
468 (1959), and his statement in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960), that "The agreement calls into being a new common law-the common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant." Id. at 579. The view that the collective
agreement is sui generis is criticized in Meltzer, supra note 121, at 480 & n.68.
131 See, e.g., Justice Whittaker's dissent in the Warriorcase, supra note 130, at 585, and
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Benedict, supra note 130. The apparent division
on the Court is reviewed in terms of the recent arbitration cases in Gould, The Supreme
Court andLabor Arbitration,12 LAB. L. J. 331 (1961).

LEX LOCI DELICTI OR LEX FORI?-CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS AND THE KTLBERG CASE

"Few principles of conflict of laws are as well settled as that, in an action to
recover for wrongful death, it is the lex loci delicti which is controlling."' The
law of the place of injury has been almost uniformly held to determine the
I Annot., Death of Passenger-LawApplicable, 13 A.L.R.2d 650 (1950). See RasrATmNr, CoNFucT op LAWS §§ 391-95 (1934); 11 AM. JUA. Conflict of Laws § 182 (1937);
2 BEALE, CONnucr OF LAWS § 391 (1935); GOODRICH, CoNFrct oF LAWS § 102 (3d ed.
1949).
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right to sue for wrongful death,2 the proper person to bring the action, 3 the
persons entitled to share in the recovery, 4 the period within which the action
can be brought,5 and the amount of damages recoverable. 6 The rule is predicated on the doctrine of "vested rights," i.e., that the tortious act immediately gives rise to an obligation on the tortfeasor according to the then exist2

E.g., Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Faron v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1948); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Williams, 113 Ala. 402,
21 So. 938 (1897). See RESTATEmENT, CONFuCT OF LAWS § 391 (1934). Note especially

§ 391(c): "The statute of the forum does not create a right of action for death if the injury to
the decedent was inflicted elsewhere." Contra,Beach v. Bay State Co., 27 Barb. 248 (N.Y.
1858), where the court held that the New York wrongful death act was applicable whether
or not the injury causing the death occurred in New York.
3 E.g., Rybolt v. Jarrett, 112 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1940); Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48,
146 At. 395 (1929); Weiner v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E.2d 673
(1949). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAws §§ 394-95 (1934). But see Howard v. Pulver,

329 Mich. 415, 45 N.W.2d 530 (1951), where the court apparently applied the law of the
forum to determine that plaintiff was the proper "personal representative" and, therefore,
entitled to bring the action.
"The question of the proper person to sue upon a foreign based death by wrongful act
claim has been a fruitful source of litigation. Owing to the usual short period of limitation
in this type of case the selection of the wrong person to sue may make recovery impossible."
CHEATHAM, GooDicH, GRISWOLD &RESE, CASES ON CONFLIcT Or LAWS 454 (4th ed. 1957).

See Annot., 65 A.L.R. 563 (1930); Note, 54 MIcH. L. Rav. 821 (1956).
4
E.g., In re Gutkowski's Estate, 135 N.J. Eq. 93, 33 A.2d 361 (1943); In re Petrasek's
Estate, 191 Misc. 9, 79 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1948); Free v. Southern Ry., 78 S.C. 57, 58 S.E. 952
(1907). See R.STATEmEr, CONFLcT OF LAWS § 393 (1934).
5
E.g., Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Cristilly v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 At.
711 (1913); Negaubauer v. Great No. Ry., 92 Minn. 184, 99 N.W. 620 (1904). "A recovery
under a death statute of the place of wrong cannot be had in any state after the time fixed in

the statute for bringing an action has elapsed." RESTATEMNT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 397

(1934).
Butsee Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), where the Court held that the
Pennsylvania court did not violate the full faith and credit clause in applying its own statute
of limitations rather than that of the place of injury. See also Tieffenbrun v. Flanery, 198
N.C. 397, 151 S.E. 857 (1930), and cases collected in Annot., 68 A.L.R. 217 (1930) and 146
A.L.R. 1356 (1943).
6E.g., Frasier v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 254 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1958); Stoltz v.
Burlington Transp. Co., 178 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 929 (1950);
Curtis v. Campbell, 76 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,295 U.S. 737 (1935); Barnes v. Union
Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Idaho 1956); Gould v. Boston & M.R.R., 282 Mass. 160,
184 N.E. 449 (1933). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 391(d), 417 (1934), and cases

collected in 15 A.L.R.2d 762 (1951).
Contra, Armbruster v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N.W. 337 (1914);
Rochester v. Wells, Fargo & Co. Express, 87 Kan. 164, 123 Pac. 729 (1912); Higgins v.
Central N.E. & W.R.R., 155 Mass. 176,29 N.E. 534 (1892). In these cases the forum maintained a limitation on the amount of damages while the lex loci delictihad no such limitation.
In applying the law of the forum, the courts rested their holdings on the rationale that
plaintiff had waived his right to extended damages under the lex loci delicti by bringing his
action in a state restricting recovery.
See also Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891), supporting the Restatement's position that the forum will always enforce its own limitation on the
amount of recovery. R

,rN, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 417, comment a (1934). More
mSTAT

recent decisions have rejected this rule: Stoltz v. Burlington Transp. Co., supra;Zirkelbach
v. Decatur Cartage Co., 119 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Ind. 1954).
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ing law of the place where the tort occurred. 7 Because the action against the
wrongdoer is transitory in nature, this obligation may be enforced against him
wherever he is found.8
Notable resistance to the rule is found, however, in cases where the death
statute of the place of injury contains a limitation on the amount recoverable,
while the forum's statute does not, and the deceased is a domiciliary of the
forum state. 9 To escape from the operation of the lex loci delicti rule in this
situation three counterbalancing conflict of laws rules have been advanced
with limited success: (1) that the issue of damages should be characterized as
procedural, thereby applying the law of the forum, (2) that the court should
refuse to apply the limited damage provision of the place of injury's statute on
the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of the forum, and thus substitute the lexfori, and (3) in cases where the death has occurred while the
deceased was a passenger on a common carrier, that the death action should
be characterized as a contract action for breach of an implied promise of safe
carriage, thereby applying the law of the place of contracting. In Kilberg v.
NortheastAirlines, Inc.,1o the New York Court of Appeals considered all three
of these theories in an effort to find a doctrinal basis whereby the consequences
of the lex loci delictirule could be avoided.

I
In Kilberg the deceased, a resident and citizen of New York, had purchased
in New York a ticket for a flight on defendant's airline from New York to
Massachusetts. The deceased was fatally injured when the plane in which he
was a passenger crashed in Massachusetts. At the time of the accident the
Massachusett's wrongful death statute prescribed a limitation of $15,000 damages as against common carriers;" New York maintains no such limitation.12
7 See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (Cardozo, J.). Mr.
Justice Holmes was a leading exponent of the "vested rights" theory: "The theory of the
foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the
forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the
person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found." Slater v. Mexican Nat'l
R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
s See Beach, Uniform InterstateEnforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656 (1918);

Currie, The Constitutionand the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 36, 66-82
(1959).
9 Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949); Curtis v. Campbell,
76 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 737 (1935); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). A similar problem is presented
where the state of injury allows unlimited recovery but the forum maintains a limitation on
the amount of damages, and the defendant is a domiciliary of the forum state. See Wooden v.
Western N.Y. & P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891).

9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
11MAss ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (1955). The limitation has now been extended to $20,000.
10

MAss. Am. LAws ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1960). Some thirteen states also maintain limitations
on the amount recoverable in death actions. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1-1 (1953);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1959); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 165, § 10 (1954).
12 N.Y. DEceD. EST. LAw § 132.
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Although plaintiff-administrator's first cause of action asserted recovery under
the Massachusett's statute, his second cause alleged that the defendant carrier
"breached its contract to carry him [deceased] safely and that as a result the
passenger's estate and his dependent suffered substantial damages (stated as
$150,000) ... which include 'loss of accumulations of prospective earnings.'
.."13 The contract for passage having been made in New York, the remedy for its breach should be governed by New York law.14 As in previous
cases, 15 the court rejected this theory.
The reluctance of the court to characterize the action as one of contract
rather than of tort is probably the result of the peculiar statutory nature of the
death action. At common law no action for damages could be maintained
against a party for the wrongful killing of another.16 The right to sue for death
is created and regulated solely by statute.17 To allow a contract action for
death damages would create an action prohibited by common law and not
specifically authorized by statute. This explanation seems particularly likely
in view of the fact that the New York court has readily indulged in contract
characterization to circumvent a sister state's damage limitation in cases
13 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 134.

14 Fish v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 211 N.Y. 374, 105 N.E. 661 (1914); Dyke v. Erie Ry.,
45 N.Y. 113, 6 Am. Rep. 43 (1871).
15 Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E.2d 412 (1945); Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23
N.Y. 465 (1861). In Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949),
plaintiff's husband purchased a ticket in New York for passage on defendant's aircraft to
Massachusetts. He was killed as a result of a crash in Connecticut which maintained a limit
of $20,000 on death damages. Plaintiff brought an action in a New York district court to
recover $250,000 in damages for the death, alleging that the action was simply one in contract
for breach of an implied promise of safe carriage, and that, the contract having been entered
into in New York, that state's law was applicable. Although sympathetic with plaintiff's
position, the court concluded that "where, as here, the gravamen of the cause of action is an
alleged breach of a duty through negligence, the action is governed by the applicable law of
torts, even though the allegations refer to a breach of contract." 178 F.2d at 140-41, quoting
from Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 193 Misc. 395, 397, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1948).
16 The common law rule was established by Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton, 1
Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). See 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 333-

36, 576-85, 676-77 (3d ed. 1922); POLLocK, LAW OF TORTS 66-72 (12th ed. 1923); PRoss.R,
TORTS 705-10 (2d ed. 1955); TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (2d ed. 1913); Comment,
Survival and Wrongful Death Actions-A Confusion of Common Law Originsand the Present
Status ofthe Law, 35 U. DaT. L.. 72 (1957).
17 "[It is law long settled that wrongful death actions, being unknown to the common
law, derive from statutes only and that the statute which governs such an action is that of the
place of the wrong.... It follows... that plaintiff as administrator has no separate right
to sue this carrier in contract for causing his intestate's death .. " 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172
N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
The American statutes have generally followed Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93
(1846). These statutes are collected in Rose, Foreign Enforcements of Actions for Wrongful
Death,33 MIcH. L. REv. 545,587-96(1935). Recent amendments can be found in 4 MART'DALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGESr (1960 ed.).
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where the action is one for personal injuries, an action recognized at common
law. 18
Although endorsing the lex loci delicti rule and holding that Kilberg's right
of action for wrongful death was governed by the Massachusetts statute, the
court, on its own motion, held that recovery was not restricted to the Massachusetts limitation. 19 The court appears to have placed this latter holding on
alternative grounds-that New York public policy prohibited the enforcement
of the limitation, and that the question of damages was procedural, rather
than substantive, in nature. Both grounds called for the application of the law
of the forum.
The court found that "New York's public policy prohibiting the imposition
of limits on such damages is strong, clear and old."20 Because the New York
Constitution expressly states that "the amount recoverable shall not be subject
to any statutory limitation,"21 the court concluded that "for our courts to be
limited by this damage ceiling (at least as to our own domiciliaries) is so completely contrary to our public policy that we should refuse to apply that part of
the Massachusetts law .... 22
This holding appears to contravene the widely praised case of Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co.,23 which also involved a wrongful death action in
which a New York decedent had been killed in Massachusetts. At the
time of the death a Massachusetts statute, similar to the one involved in
Kilberg, limited recovery and measured the amount of damages according to
the culpability of the defendant. Writing for the court, Judge Cardozo con18

In Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113,6 Am. Rep. 43 (1871), plaintiff, aNew York domiciliary, purchased a ticket in New York for passage on defendant's railroad. On the trip to New
York City he was injured as the train was passing through Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania

statute limited liability of common carriers to $3,000, but the forum had no limitation. In
holding that the action in contract for breach of an implied promise of safe passage was
properly brought, the New York court used this interesting language:
"Whatever was done in Pennsylvania was a part of the single act of transportation...
and in performance of an obligation assumed and undertaken in this State, and which was
indivisible. The obligation was created here, and by force of the laws of this State, and force
and effect must be given to it, in conformity to the laws of New York .... Effect will not be
given by the courts of a State to foreign laws in derogation of the contracts, orprejudicialto
the rights of citizens.... The actions are not given by the laws of Pennsylvania. They grow
out of the contracts and the duties resulting from the contracts, and are given by the common
law, and, therefore, the law of another State in an action brought here cannot prescribe the
measure of damages, or limit the liability of the parties." 45 N.Y. at 117-19. (Emphasis
added.)

19 While the court unanimously agreed that the contract action should be struck down, a
minority of three maintained that the Massachusetts limit should be controlling. 9 N.Y.2d
at -, 172 N.E.2d at 529-35, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138-46.
20 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
21

N.Y.CoQsT. art. I, § 16.

22.9 N.Y.2d at -, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136.

23 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (Cardozo, J.).
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cluded that there was "nothing in the Massachusetts statute that outrages the
public policy of New York."24
The two cases point out the two different ways in which "local public
policy" has been utilized in the conflict of laws. In Loucks the question presented to the court was whether New York would entertain an action predicated on a foreign statute which was allegedly contrary to the law of the
forum. In Kilberg the question was whether New York would recognize and
enforce a defense based on a foreign statute which was contrary to the law of
the forum. Use of public policy in the first way, since it leads only to a dismissal of the action, presumably does not adjudicate the merits of the case or
the rights of the parties, 25 while the second does.26 Although resort to the
public policy concept to dismiss an action based on foreign law has been
frowned upon, 27 it remains an acceptable conflict of laws technique. 2 8 The use
24 Id. at 111, 120 N.E. at 202. The question before the court in Loucks was whether New
York would apply the Massachusetts statute at all. The opinion is considered an enlightened
one in that it rejects the "dissimilarity" doctrine, whereby one state will not apply the law of
another if the two are not substantially similar. (The New York death statute is purely compensatory, while that of Massachusetts is both compensatory and penal. See Notes, 27
B.U.L. REv. 88 (1947); 29 B.U.L. Rav. 523 (1949).) Judge Cardozo saw the question simply
as whether to apply the Massachusetts law or dismiss the action. He had no doubt that only
Massachusetts law was applicable:
"Through the defendant's negligence, a resident of New York has been killed in Massachusetts. He has left a widow and children who are also residents. The law of Massachusetts
gives them a recompense for his death. It cannot be that public policy forbids our courts to
help in collecting what belongs to them. We cannotgive them the samejudgment that our law
wouldgive if the wrong had been done here. Very likely we cannot give them as much. But that
is no reason for refusing to give them what we can." Id. at 111-12,120 N.E. at 202. (Emphasis added.)
It is suggested that an even more enlightened approach would have extended the benefit of
New York law to the New York parties. Furthermore, it has been suggested that a refusal to
extend the benefit of the forum's law to a domiciliary on the basis of the occurrence of the
wrong is a denial of equal protection of the law. See Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of Laws: EqualProtection,28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1, 47 (1960). See
note 67 infra.
25 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
26 FOX v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909).
27
"In the interstate field there is considerable authority to support the view that there is,
or should be, no place for the use of the public policy argument." Nussbaum, PublicPolicy
and the PoliticalCrisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L. J. 1027, 1052-53 (1940). See also
Beach, Uniform InterstateEnforcementof VestedRights, 27 YALE L. J. 656 (1918); Goodrich,
ForeignFacts andLocal Fancies,25 VA. L. REv. 26 (1938); Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public
Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924); Nutting, SuggestedLimitationsof
the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REv. 196 (1935).
28 This statement may be challenged in view of Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) and
First Nat'I Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952), which held that it was a
denial of full faith and credit for a court to refuse to entertain wrongful death actions on the
basis that local public policy, as expressed in statutes, prohibited the bringing of such actions when the fatal injury occurred outside the forum state. The Supreme Court, however,
found that the forum statutes did not express a justifiable or legitimate public policy, for the
forum states had "no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful death suits in general."
341 U.S. at 612. The Court in Hughes goes so far as to suggest that if the statute could be
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of public policy to deny a defense recognized under the foreign law has also
been widely criticized 29 and has even been held to be unconstitutional as a
denial of full faith and credit to the foreign law:30
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In so doing,
it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right,
so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive
defense under the applicable law of another State, as under the circumstances here
3
presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not be done. 1
The distinction is an appealing one, but it is suggested that it is a distinction
without merit. Practically speaking, the dismissal of an action or denial of a
remedy may effectively adjudicate the case where there is only one forum in
which the plaintiff may bring the action. 32 Furthermore, it cannot be assumed
that when a state denies relief to a plaintiff on the ground of public policy, he
may still enforce his claim in another jurisdiction. It is often difficult to determine whether the denial of relief is a dismissal only or a judgment "on the

merits." 33 If a court in the second jurisdiction construes the first judgment as

one "on the merits," the plaintiff may be effectively denied relief.34 In an
analytical context, to refuse to enforce a defense of the foreign law is simply to
apply the law of the forum. Therefore, it is unconstitutional to deny the foreign
defense only if it is unconstitutional to apply the lex for!. Whether a court
chooses to say that local public policy prohibits the application of a foreign
law or that local public policy requires the application of the law of the forum
should make no difference when determining whether non-application of the
foreign law is a denial of full faith and credit to that law. Thus, if the New
York court was constitutionally justified in applying its own law in Kilberg, it
should likewise be justified in denying recognition of the foreign (Massachu3
setts) law. S
construed as an expression of the forum non conveniens doctrine, it would express a legitimate policy of the forum, and thus the forum would not be compelled to entertain the suit.
29 Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. Rnv. 969,
979-80, 1016 (1956). See also articles cited note 27 supra.
30 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
31 Id. at 160.
32 Service of process on the defendant may only be possible in one jurisdiction. Cf.
Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 549-50 (1923).
33 See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 228 Fed.
610 (5th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 245 U.S. 412 (1918).
34 "[Ilf the plaintiff files suit in a second forum, and the defendant pleads a prior judgment
in his favor which purports to be on the merits, established doctrine precludes the plaintiff
from attacking that judgment on the ground that it constitutes a denial of full faith and
credit; his only recourse is to seek direct review of the first judgment." Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: GovernmentalInterests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm. L.
Rnv. 9, 29 n.87 (1958), citing Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
35 The question is considered in part IlI infra.
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In addition to the public policy holding, the court in Kilberg further held
that the question of damages in wrongful death actions is one of procedure,
and is thus governed by the law of the forum. This conclusion flies in the face
of the Restatement,3 6 the treatise writers, 37 and the great majority of courts
which have considered the question. 38 All these authorities conclude that the
issue of damages in wrongful death actions is substantive in nature and, therefore, governed by the law of the place of the injury. Having recognized that an

action for wrongful death is created only by statute and has no counterpart in
the common law, 39 the court appears to have been highly inconsistent in holding that the right of action can be separated from the remedy provided by the
statute. Surely the damage provision of a wrongful death statute is an integral
part of the action created, and thus is properly characterized as a substantive
provision. The procedural characterization appears to be simply a device to
place the opinion on a less controversial legal ground than that of public

4
policy. 0

36 "The law of the place of wrong governs the amount of recovery for wrongful death as
well as the right to recover. Thus, any limitation upon the amount imposed by the law of the
place of wrong will be applicable to determine the maximum amount recoverable elsewhere.
." REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 391(d) (1934).
37

See generally 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1305-16 (1935); CooK, Tim LOGICAL AND

LEGAL BAsis OF THE CONFLIcr OF LAWS 311-46 (1949); GOODRICH, CoNFLiCr oF LAWS § 105

(3d ed. 1949); LmrLAR, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 114 (1959); 2 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS
1108-13 (3d ed. 1905).
38 See cases cited note 6 supra.
39 See text at notes 15-17 supra.
40

"Our courts should ff possible provide protection for our own State's people against
unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters. There is
available, we find, a way of accomplishing this conformably to our State's public policy and
without doing violence to the accepted pattern of conflict of law rules." 9 N.Y.2d at -,
172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
See Walsh v. Boston & M.R.R., 201 Mass. 527, 88 N.E. 12 (1909); Herrick v. Minnesota
& St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413 (1883); Wooden v. Western N.Y. & P.R.R., 126
N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891), all holding the issue of damages to be procedural. The
Wooden case was decided when New York maintained a statutory limit on the amount of
damages recoverable. The deceased and his beneficiaries were domiciliaries of New York,
and the defendant was a New York corporation. The death had occurred in Pennsylvania.
The court stated: "the restriction indicates our public policy as to the extent of the remedy,
and the plaintiff who chooses to avail herself of our remedial procedure must submit to our
remedial limitations and be content with a judgment beyond which our courts cannot go."
126 N.Y. at 17, 26 N.E. at 1051.
A related attack on the lex loci delicti rule is suggested by construing the forum's death
statute as simply removing a procedural defect of the common law rule prohibiting wrongful
death actions, i.e., the absence of a party to bring the action (the injured party being deceased). Thus, the death statute may be treated as procedural in nature, and the forum is free
to apply its own procedural law. Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
This is particularly persuasive if the forum's statute is of the "survival" type, rather than one
which creates a new cause of action for specified beneficiaries. See PROSSER, TORTS 705-09
(2d ed. 1955). Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168 U.S. 445 (1897), intimates that a death
statute may be so construed.
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II
The result in Kilbergmay be praised by those who urge greater recovery for
plaintiffs in actions for wrongful death.41 But was the result a proper one? New
York has clearly expressed its policy of allowing unlimited recovery in death
actions. This determination undoubtedly was made for the protection of its
own domiciliaries. 42 The deceased and beneficiaries were domiciliaries of New
York. Defendant, by doing business in New York, must be assumed to be
aware of this policy and to conduct his conduct and business in reference to
this policy.43 On the other hand, the Massachusetts statute expresses a policy
of protecting defendants from excessive damages. Again, this protection is
directed toward its own citizens and residents. In Kilberg, the defendant was a
corporation chartered under the laws of Massachusetts. There is a true conflict in this case: New York's policy would be advanced by applying its law to
benefit the plaintiff;44 Massachusett's policy would be promoted by having its
law applied to protect the defendant. Does the place-of-injury rule in this
situation provide a reasonable and rational means to resolve this conflict? To
this question the New York court answered:
Modem conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen
of this State to the varying laws of other States through and over which they move.
... An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours' duration pass
through several... commonwealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a State
he never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown because of bad
41See N.A.C.C.A. News Letter (Vol. 4 no. 2), Feb. 1961, p. 2.
42
Death statutes may be interpreted as providing protection to either the deceased or his
designated beneficiaries (usually next-of-kin). It is protection to the decedent in the sense
that it may be compared to an insurance policy protecting him from accidental death. It is
protection to the beneficiaries in that they are made the designated recipients of the damage
award. When both the deceased and beneficiaries are forum domiciliaries it is unnecessary
to choose between the interpretations. When the deceased is a domiciliary but the beneficiaries are non-residents, the choice of interpretation becomes essential in order to determine whether the forum has an interest in extending the benefit of its law. Professor Currie
suggests that the forum should look to the domicile or residence of the deceased: "The resident himself benefits from this assurance; it is valuable to him in the same way that a contract of accident insurance payable to his dependents would be." Currie, The Constitution
and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 IAv. L. Rev. 36, 47 (1959). See also Currie,
Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict ofLaws, 10 STAN. L. REv.
205, 221-22 (1958). This interpretation is contradicted by Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
207 U.S. 142 (1907), in which the Court held that for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause, it would look to the beneficiary, or the plaintiff (it is not clear which) as the object
of the Constitution's protection. In his dissent Mr. Justice Harlan urged the Court to focus
its attention on the deceased. 207 U.S. at 157-60.
43 It has been pointed out that it is actually the defendant's insurance company which
must bear the increased damage judgment in most cases. Note, 49 CALn. L. REv. 187, 191-93
(1961). This does not affect the suggested analysis; the insurer must be presumed to insure
with reference to defendant doing business in New York.
44 The plaintiff-administrator is actually only a nominal party designated by statute to
bring the suit. The real parties in interest are the beneficiaries or the deceased. See note 42
supra.
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weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent
may begin in one State and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely
fortuitous.45

It seems clear that accepted choice of law doctrine does not provide an adequate means to resolve the conflict in this situation. 46 Any rule which would
require the forum state to defer to the law of another state and thus defeat its
own legitimate interest in the case seems undesirable-and even absurd. 47
The result in Kilberg may be a desirable one, but the theories upon which
the court rested its decision do not provide any more rational solution to the
conflict of interests problem than the lex loci delicti rule. Having determined
that New York policy prohibits the imposition of a limit on the amount recoverable by the New York plaintiff, it seems unnecessary for the court to hold
that the damage issue is procedural. By doing so, it thereby has announced a
rule which is applicable to the question of damages in every wrongful death
situation. Surely the policy of the New York statute would not be advanced by
application of its damage provision when the action is one for the death of a
Massachusetts domiciliary whose beneficiaries are also Massachusetts domiciliaries. The procedural holding, however, would require such a result. 48
Even if the court had decided the case on public policy grounds alone, this
holding would not be free from ambiguity. Is the court saying that its public
policy prohibits the application of a damage limitation when the decedent and
his beneficiaries are New York domiciliaries, or is it perhaps asserting a more
inclusive rule to the effect that damage limitations cannot be enforced in New
York courts in any situation? Certain language in the opinion suggests the
4S 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172 N.E.2d at 527,211 N.Y.S.2d at 135. See also Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1960): "In the light of the extensive and
common use of the airplane in modem times with most flights traversing state after state
beyond the point of origin, the vagaries of differing wrongful death acts coming into play

in the event of an accident may make it desirable that earlier doctrines [of conflict of laws]
be reconsidered."
46
"When each of two states related to a case has a legitimate interest in the application of
its law and policy, a problem is presented which cannot be rationally solved by any method
of conflict of laws-that is to say, by any effort, legislative or judicial, on the part of the
states concerned to establish universal choice-of-law rules. In such a context, a choice-oflaw rule is simply a device which, typically without explicitly saying so, subordinates the
interest of one state to that of the other. A court is ordinarily not warranted in sacrificing
interests of its own state for the sake of interstate uniformity of result." Currie, The Constitution and the Choice ofLaw: GovernmentalInterests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm.
L. REv. 9, 10 (1958). Constitutional doctrines may, however, prescribe the proper law. See
part III infra.

47 "If... the forum state has an interest in the application of its law and policy, it should
apply the law of the forum even though the foreign state also has such an interest...
Currie,supra note 46, at 10.
48 See text infra at notes 70-72.
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former,49 but the holding is framed in terms of the latter0 To construe the
holding as enunciating the more inclusive holding would require the court to
apply the unrestricted damage provision in a case in which New York has no
legitimate interest, i.e., a case in which New York would not advance its policy
51
of protecting its domiciliaries by applying its unlimited damage provision.
I
The above discussion has assumed that the New York court is constitutionally free to apply whichever law it chooses to adjudicate the administrator's claim. It may be, however, that the forum is precluded from applying its
own law and is required under the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution to apply the law of Massachusetts, the place of injury. In his concurring opinion in Kilberg,52 Judge Froessel expressed "grave doubts" as to
the constitutionality of the majority's application of the lexfori in view of the
Supreme Court's decision in Hughes v. Fetter.5 3 In that case a domiciliary of
Wisconsin was killed in an automobile accident in Illinois. His administrator,
basing an action on the Illinois wrongful death statute, sued the driver of the
other car and his insurance company in a Wisconsin state court. The defendant
driver was also a domiciliary of Wisconsin, and the insurance company was a
corporation chartered under Wisconsin law. On the defendants' motion, the
trial court dismissed the complaint "on the merits." The Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal, on the ground that a Wisconsin statute which
created an action for wrongful death only if the death occurred within Wisconsin, established a "public policy against Wisconsin's entertaining suits
brought under the wrongful death acts of other states." 54 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin decision, holding that this interpretation of the statute violated the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution,
and that the Wisconsin courts were required to entertain the action. The Court
found that the case presented a conflict between "the strong unifying principle
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized by
49 "Our courts should if possible provide protection for our own State's people against

unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result from these disasters.... For
our courts to be limited by this damage ceiling (at least as to our own domicihiaries)is so completely contrary to our public policy that we should refuse to apply that part of the Massachusetts law... ." 9 N.Y.2d at-, 172 N.E.2d at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36. (Emphasis added.)
50 "We will still require plaintiff to sue on the Massachusetts statute but we refuse on
public policy grounds to enforce one of its provisions as to damages." 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172
N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136-37.
51Such a situation is the one described in the preceding paragraph, where the decedent
and his beneficiaries are not domiciliaries of the forum state.
52 9 N.Y.2d at -,

172 N.E.2d at 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 146.

53 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
54 Id. at 610.
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the statutes of sister states... [and] the policy of Wisconsin, as interpreted by
its highest court, against permitting Wisconsin courts to entertain this wrongful death action." 55 The Court concluded: "We hold that Wisconsin's policy
[of not entertaining death actions where the death occurred outside the forum]
must give way. That state has no real feeling of antagonism against wrongful

death suits in general. To the contrary, a forum is regularly provided for cases
of this nature... "56
Does the Hughes decision require the forum to apply the lex loci delicti in a
case such as Kilberg? Several considerations indicate that it does not. In
Hughes the Wisconsin court had not attempted to adjudicate the case under its
own law; it had simply denied the plaintiff the right to sue in Wisconsin. Indeed, the plaintiff had predicated his case solely on the Illinois statute. The
Supreme Court recognized this distinction in a footnote to its opinion:
The present case in not one where Wisconsin, having entertained appellant's lawsuit,
chose to apply its own instead of Illinois' statute to measure the substantive rights
involved. This distinguishes the present case from those where we have said that
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,
lawfully enacted."57
The Court in this passage appears to have been saying: "Wisconsin must open
its doors to this action even though the injury occurred in Illinois, but we do
not consider what law is to be applied to adjudicate the merits of the case-in
fact, Wisconsin may have an interest in this situation sufficient to justify the
application of its own laws." Although such an interpretation of the case is
55 Id. at 612.
56 Ibid. A similar case is First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952),
in which an executor bank brought a wrongful death action for an airplane crash in Utah
which caused the death of an Illinois citizen. The defendant airline was doing business in
Illinois and the deceased's beneficiaries were Illinois domiciliaries. An Illinois statute prohibited the entertainment of a foreign death action when the state where the death occurred
gave such an action and the defendant could be served with process therein. Because the
airline was doing business in Utah, the Federal District Court of the Northern District of
Illinois, relying on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), dismissed the action. The
Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951). On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that the full faith and credit clause forbade the application of the
Illinois statute, finding that the case was governed by Hughes.
"The Illinois statute before us today is the exact duplicate of the Wisconsin statute with
the single exception that suit is permitted in Illinois under another state's wrongful death
statute if service of process cannot be had on the defendant in the state where the death was
brought about. That Illinois is willing for its courts to try some out-of-state death actions is
no reason for its refusal to grant full faith and credit as to others.... Nor is it crucial here
that Illinois only excludes cases that can be tried in other states. We hold again that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause forbids such exclusion." 342 U.S. at 400 (Justices Jackson and
Minton concurring in the result; Justices Reed and Frankfurter dissenting).
57 341 U.S. at 612 n.10, citing Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
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inconsistent with its full faith and credit language,5 8 it is entirely consistent
with other language in the opinion and previous and later Supreme Court
decisions.5 9 In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. IndustrialAcc. Comm'n,60 the Court
stated that "one who challenges that right [the right of a state to enforce in its
own courts its own statutes], because of the force given to a conflicting statute
of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of
showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved
those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum." 61And in Carroll
v. Lanza,62 Watson v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp.,6 3 and Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. IndustrialAcc. Comm'n,64 the Court held that the forum state need have
no more than a "legitimate interest" in the application of its own law to justify
its use, not one which outweighs the interest of the foreign state.
Under these latter cases it would seem that Wisconsin would be free to
apply its own law in Hughes so long as it had a legitimate interest in so doing.
Wisconsin clearly did have such an interest. All the parties in Hughes were
domiciliaries of Wisconsin. The policy underlying both the Wisconsin and
Illinois wrongful death statutes is to protect the surviving members of a
domiciliary's beneficiaries.65 Illinois could have no interest in extending its
statutory benefit for the protection of the Wisconsin beneficiaries.66 And Illinois had no interest in protecting the Wisconsin defendants from a judgment
which Illinois would consider excessive, for the defendants had no continuing
58 "Mhe

full-faith-and-credit clause, if it means anything, means that the forum state

must defer to the law of the only state having an interest in the application of its law and
policy; there is no room for an inconsistent 'local public policy,' since it has already been
determined that the forum state has no legitimate interest in the matter." Currie, The Constitutionand the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 36, 42 (1959). "The policy
embodied in the full-faith-and-credit clause is that each state shall give appropriate effect to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of sister states, and shall refrain from intruding its own notions and policies into matters which are properly the concern of others."
Id. at 270.
59 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514
(1953); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
60 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
61 Id. at 547-48.
62 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
63 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
64 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
65 Both statutes are modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846), providing for specific beneficiaries. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70 (Smith-Hurd 1936); Wis. STAT.
§ 331 (1949).
66 It must be presumed that a legislature enacts laws for the protection and benefit of its
own residents, not those of other states. Cf. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d
944 (1953); Lams v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477, 482-83, 178 Atl. 651, 653 (1935).
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contact with Illinois. Only Wisconsin had an interest in this situation and the
67
parties; Illinois had none.
Does Hughes then preclude the New York court from applying its own law
in Kilberg? If the "legitimate interest" test of Carroll, Watson, and Pacific
Employers is utilized, New York should be free to apply its law. But if the
"balancing of interests" test of Alaska Packersis called forth, it seems dif6
7 "In a loose and abstract way, to be sure, one may say that the state of injury has an
'interest' in securing compensation whether the injured person dies or not: there is the same
need to see to it that the expenses of medical and hospital care, or even of burial, do not fall
upon the state or its residents." Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 27 (1958). Therefore, it may
be urged that this interest is protecting local creditors is a sufficient basis to call for the application of the forum's own law. This would be true if the action were one for personal injuries where the damages recovered are general assets of the injured party. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). But the great majority of
wrongful death statutes, patterned after Lord Campbell's Act, provide that damages recovered are for the benefit of designated beneficiaries only; the damages recovered do not
become assets of the estate available for the satisfaction of claims of creditors of the deceased. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70 § 2 (1959): "Mhe amount recovered in every such action
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person...."
Because Illinois' policy of protecting its creditors is not expressed in its death act, this policy
cannot be asserted as a ground upon which to predicate the application of the Illinois
statute.
It may be also asserted that Illinois has an interest in promoting highway safety within its
borders, and, therefore, that it has an interest in the adjudication of this case involving an
accident on Illinois public roads. A death action, however, is not the proper type of action
in which to express this interest. A death action is a compensatory one for the benefit of the
deceased's dependents, not a punitive one designed to punish and deter reckless and negligent conduct. (The Massachusetts statute, however, does have penal characteristics. MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1955). See Notes, 27 B.U.L. R~v. 88 (1947); 29 B.U.L. REv. 523

(1949).)
Because only Wisconsin had a legitimate interest in the Hughes situation, it is suggested
that if the action had been brought in Illinois rather than Wisconsin, the full faith and credit
clause would have required application of Wisconsin law to determine the rights of the
parties. Cf. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), a wrongful death case
in which the Supreme Court held that full faith and credit required the state where the fatal
injury occurred to defer to the state of employment's purportedly exclusive workmen's compensation act. The employee-decedent was a resident of Vermont, the employer-defendant
was a Vermont corporation, and the contract of employment was entered into in Vermont.
The decedent was electrocuted in New Hampshire when he was sent across the river which
divides Vermont from New Hampshire to repair one of defendant's installations. He left
surviving no dependents. Under the workmen's compensation law of Vermont his administrator was entitled only to burial expenses. The New Hampshire law permitted the employee
or his representative to elect to sue for damages at common law rather than for compensation. The action was brought by an administrator, a New Hampshire resident, to recover for
wrongful death.
After examining Hughes in the light of previous Supreme Court cases, Professor Currie
has concluded that the holding was actually founded on the equal protection clause. Wisconsin was, in fact, discriminating between its own citizens by allowing its domiciliaries access to
its courts only if the death occurred within the state. See Currie, The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L. REv. 36, 268 (1959). This interpretation is a persuasive one, especially in view of this statement in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514, 518-19 (1953): "The crucial factor in those two cases [Hughes and United]was that the
forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum state.
Causes of action arising in sister states were discriminated against."
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ficult, if not impossible, to determine which of the two states, Massachusetts
or New York, has a greater interest in the Kilberg situation.6 8 In any event, the
New York court has tended to obscure its interest of protecting its domiciliaries by holding that the issue of damages is a procedural question. 69
This procedural holding may also raise other problems in subsequent cases
arising out of the same or a similar fact situation as Kilbergin which the parties
in interest are non-residents of New York. Suppose that a domiciliary of
Massachusetts is also killed in the same air disaster. His administrator brings
suit in New York against Northeast, a Massachusetts corporation doing business in New York.70 It is clear that New York has no interest in giving this
Massachusetts domiciliary the benefit of its liberal damage provision. 71 Having held that the damage issue is procedural, however, logical consistency now
requires the court to apply the forum's damage provision. The court is thus
obliged to apply its rule of damages to residents and non-residents alike. To
apply the New York damage provision in this case, however, seems senseless.
New York's policy of granting maximum awards to its domiciliaries would not
be advanced, and the policy of Massachusetts of protecting its defendants from
excessive recoveries would be frustrated. The respective interests of New York
72
and Massachusetts simply do not conflict in this case.
If the court in Kilberg had simply applied its wrongful death act on the
ground that its policy of protecting its domiciliaries called for the application
of its law, it then could logically decline to apply its law in the Massachusetts
decedent's case. But would the refusal to apply the forum's law in this case
constitute unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the privileges and
immunities clause 73-and perhaps the equal protection clause ?74 It cannot be
68 The resolution of such a conflict is within the power of Congress, but it has not seen fit
to exercise its authority in this area. See Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review
State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws, 39 HAxv. L. REv. 533, 547, 557 (1926);
Currie, The Constitutionandthe Choice ofLaw: GovernmentalInterests andthe JudicialFunction, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 17-19 (1958); Hilpert & Cooley, The FederalConstitutionand the
Choice of Law, 25 WAsH. U.L.Q. 27, 31-35 (1939).
69 The procedural holding will certainly not insulate the case from full faith and credit
attack. Although the forum may apply its own law under the guise that it is simply applying
its own procedural rule, it must still have a legitimate interest in the case to justify application
of its law. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
70 Barnes v. Union Pac. R.R., 139 F. Supp. 198 (D. Idaho 1956), is apparently such a
case. Decedent and his beneficiaries were Oregon residents, the fatal injury occurred in
Oregon, and the defendant railroad was doing business in the forum, Idaho. Oregon maintained a statutory limit on death damages; Idaho did not. Held, the amount of damages
recoverable is determined by the lex loci delicti, Oregon.
71 See note 66 supra.

72 See Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 STAN. L. REv. 205, 225-31 (1958), where the "false conflict" problem is discussed.
73 U.S. CoNsr. art IV, § 2. See generally, CoRwiN, TBE CoNST1TION OF Tim Urra
STATmS OF AMmCA-ANALYSIS AND INTERPprTATION 686-93 (1953); Currie & Schreter,

UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YAI.
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deemed to be unconstitutional discrimination when a court refuses to apply
its own law when it has no interest in the case, but applies the law of the state
which is interested. "In the pursuit of its altruistic interests, a state must stop
short of trenching upon the interests of other states; therefore, the privileges
and immunities clause does not require a state to extend the benefits of its
laws to nonresidents where the state has no interest in so doing, and where so
doing would interfere with the policy of a state having a direct interest in the
matter." 75 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that to refuse to apply the law
of a state having an interest in the situation, and instead to apply the law of a
state having no interest, is to deny due process of law to the litigants76 and
77
full faith and credit to the interested state's law.
It should be pointed out that this conclusion would not be true if the defendant were not a Massachusetts corporation, but a corporation chartered
under the laws of New York or a third state doing business in New York. In
this situation, Massachusetts would have no interest in the application of its
limited damage provision designed to protect its own corporations. Although
New York would have no interest in awarding the plaintiff-administrator
(representing the deceased and his beneficiaries) maximum damages, there
would be no basis for withholding from him the benefit of the forum's extended damage award. The Massachusetts' policy would not be advanced or
defeated by applying its law. Therefore, full faith and credit or due process
would not compel the New York court to apply Massachusetts' law, while
privileges and immunities or equal protection would apparently require the
court to extend the benefit of its extended damage provision to the Massachusetts plaintiff. It is suggested, however, that New York is not required by
the privileges and immunities clause or equal protection clause to award the
L. J. 1323 (1960). "Every right, privilege or immunity created by any state in behalf of its
own citizens shall be equally extended to the citizens of other states if withholding it would
hinder free social and economic intercourse between the citizens of the several states as one
nation." McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IowA L.
BULL. 219, 219-20 (1918), reprinted in 2 ASS'N OF AM. LAW ScHooLs, SELEcTED EssAys ON
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW 402, 403 (1938).

74 The applicability of the equal protection clause depends upon the construction of the
phrase "within its jurisdiction." Ifthis phrase is interpreted to mean that the person invoking
the clause must be within reach of compulsory process of the state's courts (see Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1898)), equal protection would not be applicable in this
sitution. But if the phrase is construed to mean that voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the state's courts brings the party "within its jurisdiction" (see Kentucky Fin. Corp. v.
Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923)), equal protection would then
apply. See Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict ofLavs: Equal
Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. R~v. 1, 5-10 (1960).
7S Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Privileges
and Immunities, 69 YALE L.3. 1323, 1365-66 (1960).
76
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
77 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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78
party more than he would be entitled to under the law of his domicile. The
basis for such action would not lie in a classification between resident and
non-resident-which would clearly be an unreasonable classification under
privileges and immunities and equal protection-but a classification based
upon the extent to which the party is protected by the laws of the state in
which he resides.
Suppose, finally, that the Northeast crash fatally injures a domiciliary of a
79
third state. His administrator brings suit in a New York court, relying on the
Kilberg decision. As in the case of the Massachusetts decedent, the court,
having held the question of damages to be a procedural one, will be unable to
apply any damage law other than that of the forum. If Kilberg had applied the
interest rationale rather than the procedural-versus-substantive classification,
80
the court would not be compelled to apply its damage provision. But what
law would it then apply-that of the third state or that of Massachusetts? If
the statutes of the two states are identical, there is no conflict, and it is unnecessary to make a choice. If the statutes are not identical, they must represent
conflicting policies. Upon what basis is the New York court to determine
which of the two policies is to prevail? It has been stated that our system of

conflict of laws does not produce a rational solution to the question, 81 and

that our system of sovereign jurisdictions does not permit a court in one state
to weigh the competing interests of two other sovereign states.82 Three pos78 See Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection,28 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 36-42 (1960).
79 See Howard v. Pulver, 329 Mich. 415, 45 N.W.2d 530 (1951), involving an analogous
factual situation.
8
o See text supra at notes 71-75. Massachusetts and the third state are now the interested
jurisdictions. The application of the forum's law will neither advance nor frustrate its policy.
It cannot be deemed unconstitutional discrimination when a court applies the law of an
interested state when the forum has no interest in applying its law.
81See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 STAN. L. Rav. 204 (1958); Currie, On Displacement of the Law of the Forum,58 COLUM.
L. REv. 964 (1958).
82 "[W]here several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests in the application of their policies, a court is in no position to 'weigh' the competing interests, or evaluate their relative merits, and choose between them accordingly... I know that courts make
law, and that in the process they 'weigh conflicting interests' and draw upon all sorts of
'norms' to inform and justify their action.... But assessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a function which should not be committed to courts in a democracy. It is a function which the courts cannot perform effectively,
for they lack the necessary resources. Not even a very ponderous Brandeis brief could marshall the relevant considerations in choosing, for example, between the interest of the state of
employment and that of the state of injury in matters concerning workmen's compensation.
This is a job for a legislative committee, and determining the policy to be formulated on the
basis of the information assembled is a job for a competent legislative body." Currie, Notes
on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DuKE L.J. 171, 176-77.
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sible solutions may be suggested: (1) apply the law of the forum,8 3 (2) utilize
an arbitrary choice of law rule, such as lex loci delicti, or (3) dismiss the action
84
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The forum non conveniens solution is certainly the most appealing, for it
avoids the difficult choice of law issue and does not compel the forum to
entertain a suit in which it has no interest in the parties or their respective
rights. However, forum non conveniens may not be available for the court's
use simply because the jurisdiction may not have adopted it.85 Should the
court then apply its own law or an accepted conflicts doctrine? It seems clear
that a state may deprive a party of due process of law by applying the law of
any state having no legitimate interest in the situation. 86 The forum has no
interest in this hypothetical case, while two other states do. It would seem that
application of the law of either of the two interested states rather than that of
the forum would both be more desirable and mandatory under the due process clause. But how is the forum to determine which of the two competing
policies should take precedence? In the §uggested situation, the lex loci delicti
rule leads to a state which has an interest in the situation.8 7 But utilization of
the rule does not provide a rational choice between the two policies. The interest evaluation which is necessary to make the choice is not performed by a
perfunctory conflicts rule. Because no reason appears why the forums should
apply a particular foreign law, and because prima facie the forum is entitled
to apply its own law,8 8 Professor Currie concludes that "here no compelling
reason exists for displacing that law by the law of a particular foreign state."8 9
He further suggests that application of the lexfori in this situation violates no
constitutional provision, for full faith and credit and due process require the
83
Currie, On the DisplacementoftheLaw of the Forum,58 CoLuM. L. REv. 964, 1015-17
(1958); Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hilland the Conflict ofLaws, 28 U. Cm.
L. REv. 258, 277-81 (1961). Cf. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of
Laws, 58 MIcH. L. REv. 637, 673-75 (1960); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori in the Conflict of
Laws-Exception or Rule? 32 RocKy Mr. L. REv. 13 (1959).
84
See Currie, supra note 82, at 176-80.
85 Also, the forum may, in fact, be the most convenient one if all the witnesses happen to
reside in the state where the action is brought and the defendant is subject to service ofprocess. New York, of course, was instrumental in developing the doctrine. See Bata v. Bata, 304
N.Y. 51, 105 N.E.2d 623 (1952); Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582, 81 N.Y.S. 619 (1903).
For further discussion see Braucher, The Inconvenient Forum, 60 HAv. L. Rrv. 908 (1947);
Dainow, The InappropriateForum, 29 ILL. L. Ray. 867 (1935).
86 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
87 The defendant is a Massachusetts corporation and that state has an interest in protecting its corporation from excessive recovery. In other cases the lex locidelict may have no interest in the application of its policy as expressed in its law. Cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1950); Stoltz v. Burlington Tramp. Co., 178 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1949).
88Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935).
s9 Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill andthe ConflictofLaws, 28 U. Cm. L.
REv. 258, 278 (1961).
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forum to defer to the foreign law only if that law is the sole and specific law
applicable to the situation. 90

Professor Currie would agree, however, that application of the lex fori is
not the most desirable solution to the problem if the disinterested state had
some guide for determining which of the two states' statutes is to be applied,
i.e., which of the two policies is to take precedence. To choose between the
conflicting policies of two states is ultimately a decision which must be viewed
as a legislative one. The choice is one appropriate for Congress,91 not for a
court. This is not to say that Congress should enact choice of law rules; it
should simply decide which of two policies is to be dominant in a conflicts
situation of this type-that which protects the deceased and his beneficiaries
by granting extended damages, or that which protects the defendant by limiting the amount of recovery.
90 Ibid.Professor Hill, however, concludes that application of the law of the forum would
be unconstitutional. Hill, GovernmentalInterest andthe Conflict ofLaws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Ray. 463, 478 (1960).
91 See COOK, THE LoGIcAL AND LEGAL BAsEs OF TIE CONFLICT OF LAWS 90-107 (1949).

PROBATIONER'S RIGHT TO APPEAL; APPELLANT'S
RIGHT TO PROBATION
Of the 26,808 criminal defendants convicted and sentenced in the United
States district courts during the year ending June 30, 1958, 10,903 (41%)
were given suspended sentences and placed on probation.' All of the states
have some form of suspended sentence and probation or judicial parole
procedure. 2 Despite the widespread use of probation, there has been surprisingly little discussion of its legal aspects. 3 Perhaps because of this neglect,
the "law" of probation has failed to provide uniform solutions to recurring
legal problems. This comment will deal with three problem areas created
1 [1958] U.S. ADMNISTRATm OFFIcE OF THE UNTED) STATES CouRTs, ANN. REP. OF
THE DmncroR 208-10, Table D-4 (1959). Annual reports for the years 1954-1957 show

a similar incidence of the use of probation. Roughly 25,000 persons are under the supervision
of United States probation officers at present. See id., p. 211, Table E-1.
2 Although the terms probation and parole are sometimes used interchangeably, they
denote rather different institutions. For present purposes, the word "probation" will be
used to designate extra-mural supervision of defendants convicted of crime, ordered by
and subject to the control of the sentencing court. "Parole" is an "administrative act of
the executive or an executive agency," and, unlike probation, typically follows a period
of incarceration. 4 U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, ATr'Y GEN. SuRVEY OF RELEASE PRocEDoS
1 (1939).
3A recent exception may be found in Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation,
59 COLUM. L. Rav. 311 (1959). See GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRMNAL Jus-nc 23-46
(1933). The vast majority of the literature of probation, however, concerns itself with

sociological and administrative problems. See, e.g., FEDmAL
1960).

PROBATION,

vols. 1-24 (1937-

